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I. Introduction 
It is fortunate that little credence is given anymore to the simplistic theory that 
Japan was the only non-western nation to successfully modernize because it ex-
perienced the same kind of feudalism as the west. I have previously expressed 
my criticism in various forums of the assumptions that: Proposition 1: Feudalism 
is a historical prerequisite for modern liberalism; and that, Proposition 2: Japan 
experienced feudalism. I have been refuting these propositions in Japanese, since 
1972; in English, since 1974; and in German, since 1976, and so feel no necessity 
to repeat my arguments here. Neither is there any need to criticize these two 
propositions within the context of this symposium as Professor Eisenstadt has 
accurately analyzed the distinguishing characteristics of contemporary Japanese 
society and their historical premises. Still, I would like to make a few points re-
garding these propositions as they pertain to the topic of this paper. 
     First, as regards Proposition 1: It is safe to acknowledge that the freedom 
(staendische Freiheit) of medieval feudalism and the Staendestaat that followed 
played a decisive role in the establishment of modern freedom in the west. The 
question is whether this freedom was actually fostered in the womb of feudalism. 
A more accurate interpretation, perhaps, is that freedom prescribed the nature of 
western feudalism; in other words, western feudalism is characterized by its laws 
guaranteeing freedom. 
      My argument is based upon the perception that the structure of the west-
ern high medieval age (Hochmittelater) beginning in the 12th century was 
defined by European medieval law, and that feudalism was just one part of this 
structure. The act of Leihe (conferment, granting) that is at the core of feudalism 
or Lehenswesen is not a legal act (Rechtsgeschaeft) peculiar only to feudalism. 
The legal form of Leihe imposed certain obligations upon the recipient of a grant 
and was widely applied (W. Ebel, "Leihegedanke"). It was applied equally, 
whether in terms of the emperor's grants to the Lehnsverleihung, or a small 
village lord's endowment of a water mill to local farmers or a city lord's baking 
oven for his citizens. But the obligation imposed upon the recipient was defined 
by corresponding value and was not a blanket guarantee requiring other kinds 
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of responsibility. This was not, in other words, an absolute system of control 
forcing unlimited obligation upon the recipient of Leihe, but rather a reciprocal 
contract of mutual obligation between patron and client. 
     What is important about this term "reciprocal contract," is its implication 
that judicial law set the standard for the relationship between ruler and ruled. 
This meant that there was legal recourse for any infringement of the contract by 
either side. 
     Medieval freedom as the forerunner of modern freedom dominated not 
only the lord-vassal relationship of feudalism but also, in principle, all relation-
ships between free persons. Only a superficial view will seek to trace to feudal-
ism the historical premise for modernization when the true source is the legal cul-
ture (Rechtskultur) that distinguishes the feudalism of western Europe. 
     I believe I have made clear my stance as regards the second of the above-
mentioned propositions. The issue is not whether or not feudalism ever existed 
in Japan, but rather what kind of Rechtskultur supported Japan's feudalism (if, 
indeed, it ever existed). 
     It seems to me that Professor Eisenstadt maintains a similar perspective in 
the discussions in his book Japanese Civilization, and his work has stimulated me 
to tackle in this paper the conceptual contradiction of searching for the axis of a 
"non-axial" society. 
      To state my conclusion first: This axis could be the emperor system, and 
the structures surrounding this axis can be seen as being regulated by le as it is 
written in kanji in historiographical materials. This is not the same ie as defined 
by Shumpei Kumon, Yasusuke Murakami and Seizaburo Sato (hereinafter refer-
red to as Murakami's ie), and in this sense, this paper is a critique of their ie soci-
ety theory, too.
II. Ie conceptions 
It should be pointed out, first of all, that when Japanese discuss Ic they invariably 
do so with varying interpretations of the concept. What is worse, they tend to be 
oblivious of their own differing interpretations and so only confuse the issue even 
more. 
     It is important to realize that there are at least two kinds of Ie, the ie writ-
ten in katakana and the le written in kanji. The difference between these two 
corresponds to the difference between the social science concept of Max Weber's 
Idealtypus and historiographical terminology. Murakami's ie is the katakana ie 
used as an analytical tool in social science; a kind of Idealtypus for the discussion 
of the distinctive qualities of Japanese society. This ie has no relationship to 
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historical reality as far as the assumption that Ic first arose in eastern Japan at the 
beginning of the middle ages. It is equally unrelated to the concept of IC as nor-
mally visualized by most Japanese. 
      The decisive influence for the concept of the Murakami's le is the le of 
Susumu Ishii, the medieval historian. This is also the katakana ie and an Idealty-
pus concept. Furthermore, as Ishii himself acknowledges, this concept of le is the 
Japanese rendition of Otto Brunner's "das ganze Haus. " As Brunner says: "Das 
Haus ist im Mittelalter and darueber hinaus ein Grundelement der Verfassung im 
weiteren Sinne des Wortes; es ist eine `Freiung,' in der ein besonderer Friede, der 
Hausfriede, herrscht. ...Domus sua pro munitione habetur." 
     In Chusei bushi dan [Medieval bushi groups], Ishii describes medieval 
Japanese society using the concept of independent ie-lordship, ie-Herrschaft -
"resident rulers rooted to the land" - with the aim of "emphasizing the distribu-
tion of power and multi-dimensional facets of medieval society" in Japan. 
Throughout, Ishii has Brunner's Haus in mind, and he consistently uses the term 
ie-lordship as defined by Brunner's Hausherrschaft. It is no accident that he nev-
er uses the term ie alone. 
     Another important point is Ishii's reason for emphasizing the independence 
of the ie-lordship of the early medieval period (the Kamakura period). He states: 
"In looking back upon medieval Japan from the perspective of contemporary 
society, it seemed important to consider first of all the independence that has 
since been lost." Ishii's ie, like Murakami's ie, is an Idealtypus. But for Ishii, the 
historical transition from the early to late medieval periods and on to the modern 
era corresponds to the process by which independent ie-lordships were disman-
tled and replaced by an "absolute police state." This is a completely different 
order of argument from Murakami's premise that the le was a new structural 
principle of civilized Japanese society replacing the ancient order of uji. Muraka-
mi's hypothesis is that the le of the early medieval period, while going through 
various changes over time, continues to define modern Japan (cf. "The le...began 
with the le of the developer lords... attained a kind of apex in its evolution along 
with `modernization' and continues to the present." In contrast, Ishii writes of 
ie-lordship as disappearing with the medieval era. His Chusei bushi dan is in a 
sense an elegy to "independent ie-lordship." 
      Ishii fully realized that what he termed ie-lordship was not the same as the 
historiographical Ic written in kanji. Precisely because he was aware of this, he 
took care to write the word le only in katakana and to use only the compound 
word ie-lordship. The concept of Ie, as written in kanji, did not take firm hold 
among the general bushi (with the exception of such high-ranking buke as the 
Genji and Heike) until, as I will describe later, independent ie-lordship was on 
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the verge of extinction. 
      There is, of course, nothing wrong in creating a concept to be used as an 
academic analytical tool or Idealtypus. At issue are the usefulness of the tool and 
the appropriateness of the conclusions attained thereby. In this regard, Ishii's ie-
lordship is highly successful. 
      Murakami's le society theory, on the other hand, is a complicated and 
convoluted explanation of the le system, starting with the "early ur-ie" prototype 
of the early medieval period, tracing its reorganization into the "late ur-ie" of the 
latter half of the medieval period, and to the formation of the "great ie, " the 
"core entity" of the whole ie system. As a result, this theory treats the period 
when the le system was most widespread in the historiographical sense - when, 
in Otto Brunner's words, the le was "ein Grundelement der Verfassung" - as a 
kind of "agglutination," an era of "stagnation and fossilization," a "mere epi-
sode. " 
      Murakami further asserts that the late ur-le was not as independent as the 
early ur-ie, this original independence being transferred instead to the new social 
system of the great le that emerged in the "analogous magnification" of the ur-ie. 
At the same time, Murakami notes that this process of transformation in le 
society required "a revolutionary change in social organization. " He amplifies: 
The establishment of the great le required the simultaneous achievement of uni-
form lifestyles and a clearly defined hierarchy, a difficult task. This was in es-
sence the creation of a whole "new culture." 
      Given this argument, it would seem that "analogous magnification" is the 
fine thread linking the great daimyo le of the pre-modern era to the ur-ie of the 
early medieval period. But by Murakami's own assertions, the more logical con-
clusion, albeit unintentional on Murakami's part, is that the ur-le and the great-i.ie 
are two completely different entities. The problem with Murakami's ie society 
theory, as I see it, is that the theory tries to correct the discrepancy between 
Ishii's ic-lordship concept and the concept of the kanji le (which, as I have 
already noted, becomes "ein Grundelement der Verfassung" at the beginning of 
Japan's premodern history) with a "social dynamics" concept labeled "analogous 
magnification. " There is, furthermore, insufficient evidence to support the claim 
that the ur-ie evolved into the great le through "analogous magnification." 
      Having verified the above, it seems clear that instead of introducing a 
foreign concept like the katakana ie, it would be far more productive to clarify 
the meaning of the historiographical term, the kanji Ie, with careful attention to 
the term's connection to related concepts of the same period.
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III. Ie/Ke 
In Japanese, kanji usually have two possible readings. The first is derived from 
the original pronunciations of the character when it was first introduced from 
China and the second is the Japanese reading which is based upon the character's 
meaning. This second reading is, in a sense, a translation from Chinese into 
Japanese. An example is the character for mountain. The original Chinese pro-
nunciations for this character are san or sen. The Japanese rendition is yama. 
     The historiographically used kanji Ie is no exception. Ic is the Japanese 
reading of the character while the Chinese-based readings are ke or ka. The 
Japanese people naturally use the Japanese reading most often, both in daily life 
and academically. Murakami's le society thesis uses the Japanese reading. At the 
same time, however, the Japanese language has many compound words in which 
the kanji character Ic is read as either ke or ka. Examples include such common 
feudalistic terms as ke-nin (retainer) and ka-shin (vassal). 
      Please keep these factors in mind as I continue my discussion of Ie as a 
historiographical concept. 
      In tracing the conceptual origins of the term Ic, it is necessary to go back 
to an institution based on a system that was codified in imitation of the Chinese 
legal system and introduced in Japan at the beginning of the eighth century. For 
the great noble families who were at the political center of the Japanese nation of 
the day, Ie was a system of household administration "granted" to them by the 
state. It was, in other words, a concept of state law. Needless to say, the 
Japanese people of the day, whether nobles or farmers, all had houses or house-
holds in the social science sense. These were not, however, called Ic or even ke 
or ka. 
      Ie was an administrative unit of the national government, comparable in 
size and composition to the office to administrate a kuni, the largest regional 
administrative unit of the time, roughly equivalent to today's prefectural ken. It 
was in essence a kind of government organ whose officers were paid from state 
funds. In fact, Ie ministers and vice-ministers were recruited from the same class 
of lower nobility as their counterparts within the kuni administration, and it was 
not uncommon for a kuni officer to become an Ie officer and vice versa. 
     This system in which the state pays for the operating costs of the house-
hold may offend our modern sensibilities which insist on separating public and 
private. But it must be understood that the household management of the aris-
tocracy was as much a "national" concern for the ancient Japanese state as was 
the management of regional administrative bodies. This was because the house-
holds of the aristocratic magnates were expected to function as a part of the state 
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government organization. 
     It was expected that the nobility acting as ministers within the national 
government administration would utilize their own personal households in 
performing their appointed tasks. And it was in recognition of this that the state 
"granted" the status of Ie as an administrative unit. The Ie was thus a part of a 
national legal structure of control. 
     Notable is the fact that this system of national administration, modeled as 
it was on the advanced Chinese legal system, introduced the concept of the salar-
ied bureaucrat as an individual worker. The principles of the Ie status remained 
the same when this status was bestowed upon individuals. Thus, among those 
appointed to top administrative positions, father and son, husband and wife, 
could each have their own individual Ie. In principle, Ie was conferred upon the 
position only and was not a privilege that could be passed down from one gen-
eration to the next. Hence there is no direct link between this Ie and the Ie of the 
medieval age, there being, in fact, a number of intermediary factors separating 
the two kinds of Ie. 
     Within the documentation of the system of legal codes that were instituted 
at the beginning of the eighth century are such compound terms as ke-cho (le 
head) and ke-nin (Ie member). These terms do not refer to the organizational 
head or members of the kind of Ie structure (a device to administer the house-
holds of the nobility) described above. Rather, they were used in reference to the 
head of a blood lineage (family) and to the family's semi-free servants (like the 
Hausmannen). What this implies is that the state codes of the time also incorpo-
rated another concept of Ie different from the one described above. Within the 
context of this Ic concept, the idea of a predesignated heir (chakushi) to the head 
of household, the ke-cho, had special importance. 
     Takashi Yoshida, an authority on ancient Japanese history, has concluded 
in his studies of this additional Ie concept that there was an attempt by the state 
at this time to establish an Ie system to replace the uji system already in place. 
"The uji system in which the position of family head shifted within a wide range 
including collateral families and whose members were constantly changing as a 
consequence was too fluid a system for the 'blood-lineage groups' which headed 
the legal state." Yoshida's thesis is that in order to correct this, the Japanese state 
sought to establish a ruling class (the aforementioned great noble families who 
had been granted le) of blood-lineage groups whose leadership would be un-
ilaterally hereditary, passing from father to son (whenever possible to the eldest 
son), and that this new type of blood-lineage group was given the name of Ie in 
imitation of the Chinese model. Up until the enactment of the codes at the 
beginning of the eighth century, the Chinese character for Ie was read as yake 
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and sometimes yaka and used to refer to a storehouse or similar structure. There 
was at this stage no kind of blood-lineage group that could be equated with the 
Chinese patrimonial family as designated by the character Ie. 
     Within roughly one century, however, the reading of the character 
changed to the and eventually Ie as the policy of promoting blood-lineage groups 
at last provided a contact point between the Ie as a household management 
apparatus and the hereditary Ie passed on from father to son. As a result, the 
way in which the word Ie was used changed also. It no longer referred to a 
building or facility but was now used to allude to organizations and blood-
lineage groups, and the pronunciation Ic began to be used consistently for the 
reading of the kanji from this time. The Ie as an administrative unit, however, 
"was still not an object of succession" (Yoshida). Neither did immediately the 
nature of the Ie of blood-lineage groups change into entities of unilateral succes-
sion from father to son. They were, rather, very fluid structures "basically no 
different from the uji" (Yoshida). It would take more than two centuries before 
the consolidation of the Ie as we recognize it in later periods of Japanese history. 
Another important point that must be noted is that it was the great noble families 
at the center of state authority - and among these families those few blood-
lineage groups at the very top - who were the first in Japanese history to give 
concrete form to the concept of the le. It was for them that the two types of Ie 
described above were institutionalized, and it was their households that first pro-
vided the meeting ground for the two kinds of Ie concepts. The poor "developer 
lords" of remote eastern Japan were not involved in any way.
IV. The transition from the Ie of ancient nobles to the buke 
It is impossible in the limited time allotted here, to explain the process of con-
solidation of the Ic within the families of imperial regents and advisors, a con-
solidation which took place nowhere else. 
      Instead, suffice it to note that around the beginning of the eleventh cen-
tury, a new term read ikke or ikka meaning "one Ie" begins to appear in the 
journals of the highest ranking nobility right alongside the term Ie. In this con-
text, the word Ie refers to the Ie as an administrative unit while the word ikke is 
actually closest in meaning to Ie as the term is understood today. Ikke is at times 
used loosely in some texts to encompass collateral family, such as, for example, 
nephews. But overall, there is a convergence in the use of the term that narrows 
its meaning down to a blood-lineage group based on the principle of father-son 
succession. It is also interesting to note that in nearly every case the father draws 
upon his own Ic resources to support his son's official duties. This, despite the 
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fact that the system ensures that each individual has his or her own Ie, the im-
plication being that the son should be able to apply the resources of his own IC in 
carrying out his government-appointed responsibilities. What this tells us is that 
the Ic has evolved into a blood-lineage group shared by father and son (ikke). 
Add to this the possibility that certain duties, that is an official post, can be pas-
sed on from father to son, and we see the Ie becoming an object of succession. 
This eliminates the need to use another term such as ikke to express this concept, 
and the word Ie comes to be used to describe a blood-lineage group based on 
hereditary. 
     This is precisely what happened over the hundred-year span of the 
eleventh century. It is widely accepted in the academic world of Japanese history 
that the so-called sekkan (imperial regents and advisors) families were the pro-
totype of this kind of le. The imperial regents and advisors were the protectors 
of infant emperors and were the highest power of authority. As is already well 
known, these highest offices were hereditary within a certain family line of the 
Fujiwara clan. These families were called sekkan-ke and their Ie possessed ke-ryo 
(Ie properties). The sekkan-ke-ryo were formed in much the same way as the 
kingdoms and empires of twelfth-century Europe and were based on the same 
hereditary principles which dictated that those who attained the position of king 
or emperor would inherit these kingdoms and empires. Ke-ryo were passed on 
from one generation of imperial regent/advisor to the next. 
     What is noteworthy here is that the succession of Ie and ke-ryo is tied to 
the succession of official post or duties. And precisely because of this link there 
emerges the concept of ka-gyo (Ic business). By the late Heian-early Kamakura 
period (late twelfth century to early thirteenth century), even the Ie of the lower 
ranking nobility had their respective ka-gyo. These Ic specialized in a wide di-
versity of fields such as music, literature, and law, many of which have been car-
ried down to this day. 
     A decisive factor is that all of these diverse ka-gyo were inseparable from 
service to the emperor. This brings us to Masao Maruyama's seiji (matsurigoto) 
no kozo - seiji ishiki no basso ostinato [The Structure of Politics: the basso osti-
nato of Political Awareness] (Maruyama Masao shu [Masao Maruyama Collec-
tion], Vol.12, p.205). The task of the sekkan was to protect and serve the emper-
or, in the same way as the myobo-ka legal specialists applied their specialized 
knowledge to imperial service. The Ic was, in other words, a resource for the 
execution of official tasks that were perceived as ultimately serving the emperor. 
The Ie as an organization retains this characteristic of existing solely for imperial 
service even as these official tasks become something that is passed on from 
father to son and even as the Ie comes to be identified with blood-lineage groups 
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based on unilateral heredity. 
     Because of this, it was important that the head of an le be capable of car-
rying out the necessary official tasks. An adoption system was necessary, there-
fore, in the event that a natural heir should prove incompetent or incapable of 
performing the required duties. The Hossoshlyosho, a legal commentary of the 
early Kamakura period, explicitly states: "The adopted child [exists] to carry on 
the Ic business (ka-gyo)." We see here the origins of Murakami's "ultra-kin-
ship. " 
     Here, I would like to present my thesis: The Ie is a group that exists to 
serve a higher-ranking ruler, ultimately, the emperor. A corollary to this is that 
the emperor has no Ie and no Ie name. The prototype for this Ie are the sekkan-
ke forerunners and Ic of nobility that were formed after the eleventh century. 
The Ie were born of the upper classes and the system gradually filtered down 
over time to become a universal institution in Japanese society. 
     Japanese "feudalism" is generally defined by the emergence of a govern-
ment (bakufu) run by the bushi or samurai. The subject who shouldered the 
burden of running this military government were the buke, the Ie who provided 
hereditary military service to the emperor. It is interesting to note that such 
terms as ji-ke (temple Ie) and sha-ke (shrine Ic) were allegorically used at times 
along with the term buke. Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines were not heredit-
ary groups, but were still counted among the Ic for the "service" they rendered 
as protectors of the state and the emperor. 
     As the above example shows, for the purpose to indicate a certain Ie the 
kanji Ie was at first added to whatever kanji described a ka-gyo or type and rank 
of service to the emperor. (It is no accident, I believe, that we still refer to mer-
chant and farming families, for example, as sho-ka and no-ka.) And as the 
lineage involved in the ka-gyo expanded (through family fragmentation and the 
like), we see the formation of Ic designated by proper nouns; for example, 
among the sekkan-ke there emerged the Nijo-ke, Sanjo-ke, and Kujo-ke, while 
among the bukc are such illustrious names as the Heike and the Genke (Genji).
V. Those with Ie and those without 
As I have already noted, the Ic disseminated from the upper classes to the lower 
to eventually become universal. I would like to look at the Kobayakawa family 
(also used as a case study by Susumu Ishii and Murakami, et. al.) to trace the 
manner in which this kind of dissemination took place among the buke who was 
the driving force of Japan's "feudalism." 
     The "Kobayakawa Hirokage Testament" [Kobayakawa Hirokage okibumi] 
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written at the end of the fifteenth century includes detailed instructions as to the 
status and treatment of all those under Kobayakawa's administration. He begins 
with the allocation of status: kin (shinrul), those inside (uchi no mono), and 
intermediaries (chugen). The latter two categories are in a clearly defined hierar-
chical relationship; that is, all those other than kin were either in the higher rank-
ing uchi no mono group or in the lower ranking chugen group. The system 
allows those of chugen rank who have provided exceptional service to up-grade 
to uchi no mono rank. 
     Significant is the fact the uchi no mon were those with Ie and the chugen 
were those without Ie, in other words, those without surnames. Again, care 
must be taken not to interpret Ie merely as "household" in the sociological sense. 
Those without le are listed right along side farmers (hyakusho). They were not 
slaves and certainly had their own households. The distinction of having or not 
having an Ie was an indication of whether one was incorporated or not within 
the formal order of status. For example, those formally listed as a part of the 
military organization of the Numata clan - Kobayakawa's lord - all have le. 
Needless to say, both Numata and Kobayakawa also have their respective Ie. 
Kobayakawa's relatives all have lower-ranking le, as do all of the uchi no mono. 
The system works like a nest of boxes. 
      Murakami interprets this as a process whereby the lower-ranking le grew 
into the "great ie," but the correct interpretation is that the lower-ranking Ie 
were formed only with the formal recognition of the higher-ranking Ie. 
     It can be surmised that this Ic concept had already begun to filter down to 
the lower-ranking bushi level not too long before Kobayakawa Hirokage's okibu-
mi was written. The word Ie does not appear at all in a Kobayakawa okibumi of 
just a half-century before. The term ikke first appears in an okibumi written in 
1451, but is used to encompass all kin (including collateral families) in a much 
wider application of the concept than that used in the journals of the nobility of 
the early eleventh century. In this latter case, the character for "one" that is used 
in the term ikke is probably best translated as "united" or "unified." 
      Unfortunately, this marks the limits of my research to date and I am un-
able to present further evidence to support my thesis. Still, I would like to stress 
that to have Ie meant that one was incorporated into the hierarchy of those serv-
ing the emperor, or, to put it more accurately, that the bestowment of Ie was a 
formal acknowledgement of incorporation into this hierarchy. Whether or not 
those thus incorporated into the hierarchy were conscious of the emperor as the 
object of their service is not the issue here; those at the foot of a mountain are 
seldom able to see to the very top. Not surprisingly, it is common to refer to the 
emperor's palace as being "above the clouds!" 
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VI. The wealth of the Ie 
Japanese "feudalism" was an aggregate of le whose ka-gyo was to provide milit-
ary service to the emperor. Referred to en masse as buke, these formed a single 
Ie. It is inappropriate, within this context, to view the emperor-shogun relation-
ship as being between equals within a dual-structure state. Wars were frequent in 
the period spanning the founding of the Kamakura bakufu to the Meiji Restora-
tion, but they did not represent an equal contest between the emperor and baku-
fu. In most cases, these were battles over who was to fill the position of buke no 
toryo (the leading provider of military service to the emperor, the highest-rank-
ing recipient of this service). True, there was antagonism between the emperor 
and the buke at first and this antagonism did erupt into armed conflict at certain 
times (the civil war of 1221 and Emperor Godaigo's punitive attack on the 
Kamakura bakufu in 1333), but these were instigated by the emperor's desire to 
remove the buke no toryo of the time. 
     Attaining the status of buke no toryo and a toryo's establishment of his 
own government were not necessarily one and the same thing. For example, the 
Heike who held the toryo status before Yoritomo made no attempt to create 
their own independent government (bakufu) and were content to enjoy their 
power within the context of the ancient state system. Yoritomo, on the other 
hand, did indeed set up his own bakufu and for good reason. The bushi wanted 
their wealth to be protected under a different system than the legal system and 
practices of the ancient state, and this meant that a new kind of government was 
necessary. Under the old system, the holdings of the bushi were recognized only 
as various offices (shiki) under the jurisdiction of regional and upper nobility 
shoen administration. The rights of property were conferred only in conjunction 
with appointment to these shiki. The samurai were not allowed to automatically 
keep these ownership privileges through hereditary means, and instead each suc-
cessor had to be newly appointed to the shiki which his predecessor had occupied 
before he could claim such rights. This was, to put it simply, a system that did 
not recognize the concept of private property in the real sense. 
     The bushi needed a legal system and an authority that would recognize 
their wealth as private property in the real sense of the term. Indeed, early in his 
government, Yoritomo issued numerous ando (recognition) documents certifying 
the bushi's rights of ownership of their shiki. The problem was, this was a re-
cognition of rights of shiki by someone other than the original conferrer of the 
office, a basic contradiction in principle. Theoretically, there were a number of 
possible ways in which this contradiction could be resolved. 
     The most radical solution was to detach the bushi's wealth from the shiki, 
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but this implied the dismantling of the already existing state structure, a com-
pletely unrealistic proposal at the time. No one (not even the bushi) bothered 
with this possibility. 
      Another solution was for Yoritomo himself to become the conferrer of the 
privileges in question, even though this would actually go against the bushi's ori-
ginal wishes. A third solution, somewhere between these two extremes, was to 
simply accept and carry on with the contradiction. This meant that the buke no 
toryo, as the representative of the bushi office holders, would continue to apply 
"political" pressure on the imperial court. 
     The bushi were willing to go with this third solution, but Yoritomo chose 
the second, a choice that naturally led to friction. When Yoritomo had estab-
lished his military superiority (over all except northeastern Japan), he received 
from the emperor the right to have an le as defined by the codes then in place. 
Just as the ancient noble Ie had done, Yoritomo set up a mandokoro as the cen-
tral administrative office of his Ie and had this office administer his toryo tasks. 
At this point there was fighting between Yoritomo and his ke-nin retainers over 
the validity of his ando documents. 
      Prior to the establishment of the mandokoro, Yoritomo and the bushi en-
joyed a personal lord-vassal relationship and the ando documents were signed by 
Yoritomo himself. But after the founding of the mandokoro, the certificates 
issued by the mandokoro replaced Yoritomo's personal vouchers. The bushi 
were not happy with these pieces of paper issued by bureaucrats within an office 
that was certainly not their lord. They wanted Yoritomo's signature, but with a 
very few exceptions, this was not granted. The bushi had supported the bakufu 
in the hopes that it would release them from the bonds of the legal system of the 
ancient state, but instead the establishment and operation of Yoritomo's man-
dokoro represented a total assimilation into the ancient system. The same struc-
ture whereby the ancient nobility had guided their following to serve the emper-
or was now applied to the buke. 
      This represented the first change in the aforementioned "contradiction." 
The next change was particularly acute for it involved a complete transformation 
of the way in which bushi wealth existed. The various "offices" which repre-
sented their wealth were now uniformly called jito shiki, office in charge of 
maintaining regional peace and order, and were bestowed by Yoritomo in a bril-
liant move that at once erased the troubling "contradiction." In that the conven-
tional offices of regional administration and the shoen were renamed jito shiki, 
this change represented a partial power shift from the ancient state system to 
Yoritomo who now enjoyed, as the buke no toryo and at least as far as this mat-
ter went, a part of the authority that had once belonged to the ancient state or 
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emperor. But the bushi paid a great price for this power shift, for the bakufu 
that had acted for them as a pressure group upon the appointive powers of their 
offices was now itself the source of their appointments and dismissals. The result 
was that the buke were transformed into an aggregate of office holders appointed 
by the bakufu to the office of jito shiki by which they were placed in charge of 
maintaining peace and order (and thereby serve the emperor). The military ser-
vices provided by the buke were now a part of their official duties as jito shiki 
officers and their properties were the payment for this service. 
     Within the Kamakura judicial system, cases involving bushi property were 
called shomu zata. Shomu refers to the carrying out of one's official duties. 
Thus, shomu zata connotated a dispute over the rights/competencies of carrying 
out official duties. I consider this an indication that the Ie concept had taken root 
within the dimensions of the Kamakura judicial system, for here we see the prop-
erty or wealth of the Ie as payment for services (the carrying out of official 
duties) rendered. 
     The jito shiki system and shomu zata are peculiar to the Kamakura period. 
This may raise the question of whether Ishii's thesis can be generally applied to 
the "feudalism' of the Muromachi period and after, but there is no time here to 
refute this in detail. Suffice it to say that by the Tokugawa period, bushi proper-
ty was no longer something that could be fought over in court. By this time, the 
idea that the property of the le represented payment for services rendered had 
advanced from the Kamakura period perception to one in which the Ie was now 
perceived as a resource to be drawn upon in supplying the required services. 
This latter perception reminds me of when the ancient nobles were first granted 
Ie as a household management apparatus to better carry out their official tasks.
127
